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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At issue in this case is whether Appellants, Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC 
( collectively "Clark"), may bring an action: (1) to enforce an attorney lien under Idaho Code 
§ 3-205 against Clark's opposing counsel, Respondents Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman and Christopher Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill"), although Jones 
Gledhill never actually possessed the funds to which Clark claims he is entitled; or (2) for 
negligence because of Jones Gledhill's purported "failure to protect" Clark's alleged interest in 
his former clients' settlement funds. 
I. Factual Background 
Clark, an attorney, represented Travis Forbush, Gretchen Hymas and Breanna Halowell 
( collectively "Clients"), in a wrongful death and personal injury action, entitled Forbush v. 
Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Ada County Case No. CV PI 1304325 
("underlying action"). 1 (R. 19 at ,r 17.) Clark filed that underlying action against Anfinson 
Plumbing, LLC ("Anfinson"), among other defendants. (R. 17 at ,r 5.) Jones Gledhill 
represented Anfinson in the underlying action. 
Eventually, Spence appeared in the underlying action on behalf of the Clients and co-
counseled with Clark against Anfinson. (R. 19 at ,r 18.) In August 2015, Clark withdrew from 
representation. (R. 19-20 at ,r,r 19-20; see also Appellants' Brief at p. 3.) After his withdrawal, 
Clark sent Jones Gledhill a letter in September 2015, stating he was "asserting an attorney lien 
1 A portion of this underying action currently remains pending before this Court. Forbush, et al. 
v. Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Supreme Court No. 44053 (filed March 21, 
2016.) 
1 
according to LC. § 3-205" and requesting Jones Gledhill to "include [his] name on any 
settlements checks." (R. 15.)2 Clark, however, never filed and served a notice of an attorney 
lien in the underlying action. 
Several months later, Anfinson settled the Clients' claims for policy limits of $1,000,000. 
The trial date was impending, and to obtain a dismissal for Anfinson, Jones Gledhill conveyed a 
check from Anfinson's insurer to Spence per the parties agreed upon settlement. Because Clark 
had withdrawn from the Clients' representation, Jones Gledhill did not communicate with Clark 
regarding Anfinson' s settlement. 
In February, Clark threatened to sue Jones Gledhill for its purported "failure to protect 
settlement funds" for him. (See R. 9.) Clark sent Jones Gledhill a draft complaint alleging that 
Jones Gledhill "owed Clark a duty to protect his lien" by including Clark as a payee on the 
settlement check and that Jones Gledhill breached this duty by delivering the check to Spence 
without Clark's name on it. (See R. 13 at ,r,r 25-27.) Notably, however, Jones Gledhill had no 
personal knowledge of Clark's purported entitlement to any of his former Clients' settlement 
funds. 
Obviously, as Clark's opponent, Jones Gledhill had no means by which to resolve Clark's 
dispute with his former Clients. Jones Gledhill did not know the terms of any fee agreement 
between Clark and his former Clients or between Clark and his former co-counsel, Spence. It 
did not know the nature of any dispute between Clark, the former Clients and Spence. It was not 
2 Clark's Amended Complaint references this letter as an exhibit, but fails to attach it. (See R. 20 
at ,r 20.) It is attached, however, to Clark's original complaint. (R. 15.) 
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privy to the reasons for Clark's withdrawal. It did not know whether that withdrawal was 
voluntary or at the former Clients' requests.3 It did not know whether Clark's termination was 
for cause or without cause. It did not know whether the Clients had any claims against Clark, 
which might offset his fees. And, it did not know whether Clark's claim for fees against his 
Clients or Spence had already been satisfied. 
Further, Jones Gledhill's legal research showed Clark had no viable claim against Jones 
Gledhill. In response to Clark's threat to sue, Jones Gledhill sent Clark a letter citing legal 
authority that§ 3-205 did not provide for an attorney lien against an attorney's opponent. 
(R. 131-32.) Specifically, Jones Gledhill cited Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928 
(1983), which provides: 
[The attorney] asserts he may claim any sum in fees without the necessity of 
proving the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process and that he 
may then levy against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to 
the contract under which [the attorney] claims money. We decline to so interpret 
the attorney's charging lien .... 
Id at 465, 660 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added). Jones Gledhill also cited In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 
476 (D. Idaho 1999), which relied upon Frazee to conclude that "[t]he plain language of[§ 3-
205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against the lawyer's own client. There is nothing 
in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in favor of an opponent's lawyer." Id 
at 484 ( emphasis added). 
3 Clark alleges in this case that "due to [Spence's] malpractice and incompetence, Clark 
withdrew from the case." (R. 19 at 119.) Jones Gledhill, however, has since learned that Clark 
actually withdrew from the case because the Clients terminated his representation. (See, e.g., 
R. 279.) 
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II. Procedural Background 
Ignoring this authority, Clark sued Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016. (R. 8-15.) 
Thereafter, Clark amended his complaint to increase his purported damages from $140,000 to 
$500,000. (Compare R. 13 at 128 with R. 21 at 128.) The exact nature of Clark's claim against 
Jones Gledhill is somewhat unclear. Although Clark alleges his case is "an attorney lien case," 
his allegations suggest he is attempting to sue Jones Gledhill in negligence for breach of a 
purported "duty to protect Clark's lien." (Compare R. 17 at 11 with R. 21 at 1125-28.) 
Jones Gledhill moved to dismiss Clark's action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim, and it construed Clark's complaint broadly as 
asserting both an action to enforce an attorney lien and a negligence claim. In support of its 
motion to dismiss, Jones Gledhill argued that: ( 1) it did not owe Clark a duty of reasonable care 
to protect his attorney lien, (R. 31-32); (2) regardless, the litigation privilege barred Clark's 
action because Jones Gledhill was acting on behalf of its client, Anfinson, when settling the 
claims against it, (R. 27-28); and (3) § 3-205 did not authorize a lien against Jones Gledhill, 
Clark's opponent. (R. 29-31.) 
In opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion, Clark filed numerous documents outside the 
pleadings, including documents containing his former Clients' attorney-client privileged 
communications and protected work product. (See, e.g., R. 236-48, R. 250-54, R. 266.) Jones 
Gledhill moved to strike all of Clark's submissions under Rule 12 because they were outside the 
pleadings and unnecessary for resolving Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 12(d) (matters outside the pleadings but not excluded require motion to be treated as 
4 
summary judgment motion); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(f) ("The court may strike ... any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."). Meanwhile, Clark's former Clients 
specially appeared per Rule 32 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules to request that a subset 
of Clark's submissions outside the pleadings-i. e., their attorney-client communications and 
work product-be sealed from public disclosure. (R. 356-65.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and other 
pending motions, the district court stated that it intended, among other things, to grant Jones 
Gledhill's motion to dismiss and that it would prepare a written order. (R. 144-45, pp 33:17-
34:16.) Before that written order was entered, however, Clark moved for reconsideration and 
also to amend his complaint to add new defendants, including Anfinson and its insurer. (See 
R. 61-63, R. 305-17, R. 318-25, R. 326-52.) 
Before Jones Gledhill responded to Clarks' new motions, the district court entered its 
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. 74-76.) At the 
same time, the district court also entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion 
to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice 
("Memorandum Decision"). (R. 64-73.) In its Memorandum Decision, the district court 
dismissed Clark's complaint, correctly concluding that Clark could prove no set of facts in 
support of a claim that would entitle him to relief against Jones Gledhill. (R. 72.) 
In support of this conclusion, the district court ruled that Jones Gledhill "owed no 
contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests." (Id) Further, it ruled that Clark 
could not assert an unperfected lien (i.e., one that had not already been reduced to an enforceable 
5 
sum certain) against Jones Gledhill. (See R. 71.) Specifically, it ruled that "[w]ithout 
affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his lien by 'reducing it to a judgment or order of the 
court,' no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of money on behalf of his former Clients." 
(Id.) The district court also noted that even if Clark eventually did perfect his lien, he could 
never enforce it against Jones Gledhill because Jones Gledhill no longer possessed the settlement 
check or proceeds. (R. 72.) Finally, the district court denied Clark's motions for reconsideration 
and to amend his complaint concluding that Clark's "filings do not add any new facts or 
authorities that bear on the correctness of the judgment of the court." (R. 75.) 
Subsequently, the district court awarded Jones Gledhill $26,250 in attorney fees under 
Idaho Code§ 12-121, concluding Clark "brought and pursued this case frivolously, umeasonably 
and without foundation .... " (R. 213.) In support of this conclusion, the district court found that 
Clark (1) had disregarded established case law; (2) did not argue a new or novel interpretation of 
§ 3-205, but rather argued that the district court should reject established case law; and (3) had 
been specifically warned by Jones Gledhill before filing the action that it was barred by 
established case law. (R. 212-13.) Further, the district court noted that Clark unnecessarily 
increased the cost of litigation by filing confidential documents in the record that had no bearing 
on Clark's case. (R. 213.) 
Clark appeals the district court's award of fees, the dismissal of Clark's action, and the 
sealing of his former Clients' confidential information. In support of his appeal, Clark attempts 
to "incorporate" the "facts" in his opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss and in his 
allegations in another complaint, an action against his former Clients, Clark v. Forbush, Ada 
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County Case No. CV-OC-1604217 ("ClarR'). 4 An overwhelming majority of these purported 
"facts," however, are irrelevant to this appeal, including Clark's self-serving descriptions of 
events in the underlying action and of his disagreements with his former Clients' and co-
counsel's decisions in that action. 
One collateral fact is important to note, however: One week before Clark sued Jones 
Gledhill on March 10, 2016, he filed the Clark action against his former Clients on March 3. 
(See R. 329-52.) Among other things, Clark alleges in Clark that his former Clients breached 
their fee agreements with him and that they tortiously interfered with Clark's fee-split agreement 
with Spence. (See R. 336 at ,r,r 41-44; R. 338-39, ,r,r 62-66.) Further, he alleges in Clark that he 
is owed fees in various different amounts, including $40,000, (R. 338 at ,r 55); $140,000, (R. 339 
at ,r 66); $500,000, (R. 336 at ,r 44; R. 338 at ,r 61) and an indeterminate amount into the future. 
(R. 337 at ,r 50.) Jones Gledhill also understands that Clark subsequently amended his complaint 
in Clark to assert claims against Spence. (See Appellants' Brief at 3 (stating Clark has sued his 
former co-counsel for fees).) Clark's allegations in Clark highlight that even Clark cannot 
definitively state whether his former Clients or Spence or both owe him fees and in what 
amount-the very concern which prompted the district court to conclude in this case that Clark 
had to perfect his lien. 
4 Clark filed Clark in the wrong venue, and the district court has since transferred it to Canyon 
County, Case No. CV-2016-06347. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In Clark's "Issues Presented on Appeal," Clark challenges the district court's dismissal of 
his complaint, its award of attorney fees to Jones Gledhill and its decision to seal certain records. 
Clark does not list the district court's denial of his motion to amend as an issue for appeal. 
(Appellants' Brief at 4 (listing issues). But, Clark appears to challenge that decision. (Id. at 11 
("The District Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend.") Jones Gledhill, 
therefore, addresses whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Clark's 
motion to amend. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court's Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6) Was Proper. 
This district court properly dismissed Clark's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim. Under Frazee, Clark's claim fails because he did not perfect his lien before 
attempting to enforce it against Jones Gledhill. Furthermore, Clark fails to meet the five 
requirements for enforcing an attorney lien set forth in Skelton v. Spencer, l 02 Idaho 69, 625 
P.2d 1072 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Kinghorn v. Clay, 153 Idaho 462,467,283 
P.3d 779, 784 (2012). To the extent Clark's claim is an attempt to allege negligence, it fails 
because Jones Gledhill had no legal duty to include Clark's name as a payee on Anfinson's 
settlement check or otherwise to protect Clark's interest in his former Clients' settlement funds. 
Moreover, the litigation privilege protects Jones Gledhill from liability for acting on Anfinson's 
behalf and in its best interests. 
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A. Standard of Review 
Clark incorrectly states that the standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. 
(Appellants' Brief at 11 ("[T]he District Court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal 
standard."); see also id. at 10 (same); id at 13 (same).) A motion to dismiss is proper if"it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that 
would entitle him to relief." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). In reviewing 
a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the proper standard requires this Court to view all facts and 
inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party to determine whether a claim for 
relief has been stated. Coalition/or Agric. Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142,145,369 
P.3d 920, 923 (2016). 
B. Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney Lien Against Jones Gledhill. 
Clark failed to state a viable claim to enforce an attorney lien, as the district court 
correctly ruled. Clark challenges this ruling by claiming there was a "fund" against which to 
assert his lien so the district court incorrectly analyzed his claim under Frazee instead of Skelton. 
(Appellants' Brief at 10-11.) Clark's argument is without merit. Regardless of whether Clark's 
claim is analyzed under Frazee or Skelton, Clark's claim necessarily fails. 
In Skelton, a law firm sought to enforce an attorney lien under§ 3-205 against its former 
client, Spencer. 102 Idaho at 70, 625 P.2d at 1073. Spencer had retained the law firm to handle 
numerous matters related to her husband's estate. Id. at 70-71, 625 .2d at 1073-74. Spencer 
became dissatisfied with the law firm and discharged it. Id. at 71,625 P.2d at 1074. 
Subsequently, the law firm filed a "notice of claim of attorney's lien" in three separate cases 
9 
including case no. 20500, which was an action against Spencer to enforce a settlement agreement 
that the law firm had previously negotiated on Spencer's behalf. Id at 71, 625 P.2d at 1074. 
Later, the plaintiffs in case no. 20500 deposited with the court a fund of $157,500, which they 
owed Spencer under the former settlement. Id at 72, 625 P.2d at 1075. The law firm "filed a 
petition in no. 20500 to enforce the lien against the fund." Id. Spencer opposed the petition, but 
the court entered findings of fact and conclusions oflaw awarding the law firm a portion of the 
funds deposited with the court for Spencer's benefit. Id at 72-73, 625 P.2d at 1075-76. 
On appeal, the Court upheld the award to the law firm. It concluded that "[t]he law is 
well settled that an attorney in asserting a charging lien is entitled to recover against sums which 
his efforts have brought forth." Id. at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. Further, the Court specifically 
concluded that the law firm's efforts created the deposited funds: "The monies paid into court in 
case no 20500 were the product of the settlement brought forth by the efforts of [ the law firm]." 
Id. Finally, the Court concluded that the law firm had met the five requirements necessary for 
enforcing a charging lien against its former client, including: 
(1) That there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on 
equitable principles, (2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or 
primarily to secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid, (3) that it was 
agreed that counsel look to the fund rather than the client for his compensation, 
(4) that the lien claimed is limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in 
the litigation by which the fund was raised and (5) that there are equitable 
considerations which necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
lien. 
10 
Id. at 76,625 P.2d at 1079 (citation, quotations and parentheses omitted); see also In re Harris, 
258 B.R. 8, 13 (D. Idaho 2000) (identifying Skelton requirements); Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 
270,274, 731 P.2d 813,817 (Ct. App. 1986)(same). 
In contrast to Skelton, which affirmed the enforcement of an attorney lien, the Court in 
Frazee rejected an attorney's attempt to enforce a lien under§ 3-205. In Frazee, attorney Reeves 
represented Elaine Frazee against her husband, Kenneth, in a divorce. 104 Idaho at 464, 660 
P.2d at 929. The divorce decree required Kenneth to pay $3,000 in cash to Elaine overtime. Id. 
Meanwhile, Reeves had billed Elaine $2,800 in fees for representing her in the divorce, which 
fees remained unpaid. Id. After Kenneth had already paid Elaine nearly the entire $3,000, 
Reeves filed a notice of attorney lien for $2,800 in the divorce action and sought to foreclose his 
lien against Kenneth. Id The court denied Reeves' claim oflien against Kenneth, and Reeves 
appealed. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial. In doing so, the Court rejected Reeves' broad 
interpretation of§ 3-205: 
Reeves asserts that he may claim any sum in fees without the necessity of proving 
the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process and that he may then 
levy against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to the 
contract under which Reeves claims money. We decline to so interpret the 
attorney's charging lien statute .... 
Id. at 465,660 P.2d at 930; see also In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. at 484 ("The plain language of 
[§ 3-205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against the lawyer's own client. There is 
nothing in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in favor of an opponent's 
11 
lawyer. Frazee . .. expressly rejected the attempted assertion of a charging lien 'against the 
property of the opposing party."' ( emphasis in original)). 
In rejecting Reeves' argument, the Court considered "the ethical and policy 
considerations" involved in construing an attorney lien statute to allow an attorney to attach 
property for "unadjudicated and unliquidated claims." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465,660 P.2d at 
930. It noted that allowing an unperfected attorney lien would in turn allow an attorney to cloud 
the title of property "with 'claims of an attorney lien' without resort to any adjudication of such 
claims" and thereby create "[t]he potential for economic coercion by the attorneys." Id (citing 
Ross v. Scannell, 647 P.2d 1004, 1008-09 (Wash. 1982)). 
The Frazee Court also noted that allowing the attachment of an unperfected attorney lien 
against Kenneth's property would deny him due process to challenge the amount or propriety of 
Reeves' claim for fees. Id at 466, 660 P.2d at 931. See also Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 
644,648,991 P.2d 369,373 (Ct. App. 1998) ("When seeking enforcement of an attorney's lien, 
due process must be afforded."). Finally, the Court distinguished Skelton by noting that there 
was no "fund" against which to assert a lien because Kenneth had already paid Elaine: "[In 
Skelton], a 'fund' was in existence representing the sums that the attorney had obtained for his 
client. Here no such 'fund' existed, since the moneys had already been paid to the client." Id 
at 466, 660 P .2d at 931 ( emphasis added). 
1. The District Court Properly Relied Upon Frazee. 
Frazee is directly on point. Contrary to Clark's assertion, there is not and never was any 
"fund" in Jones Gledhill's possession against which Clark could assert a lien. As Clark 
12 
expressly acknowledges in his allegations, by the time Clark sued Jones Gledhill, Anfinson had 
already sent the settlement check to Spence via Jones Gledhill. (See R. 20 at ,r 21 ( alleging 
Anfinson sent check to Spence).) Because Anfinson had already paid the Clients before Clark's 
lawsuit, there was no "fund" in Jones Gledhill's possession created by Anfinson's oavment 
- .. ..L .,, 
against which Clark could enforce a lien. See id ( concluding no fund exists if "the moneys had 
already been paid to the client"). As the district court correctly ruled, the settlement check had 
"already gone through the hands of [Jones Gledhill], never to return." (R. 72.) 
Moreover, there was no "fund" in this case because, as Clark concedes in his allegations, 
what Jones Gledhill received from Anfinson and conveyed to Spence was merely a check-not 
actual "proceeds." A check is a type of negotiable instrument. Idaho Code § 28-3-104(6). A 
negotiable instrument is not property, but rather a promise or order to pay: '" [N]egotiable 
instrument' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money .... " 
Idaho Code§ 28-3-104(1). "A lien is an encumbrance on property." Liberty Mortgage Corp. v. 
Fiscus, 379 P.3d 278,285 (Colo. 2016) (concurrence) (emphasis added). A lien cannot 
encumber a check because it is not "property." Accordingly, that Jones Gledhill conveyed a 
check does not mean, as Clark contends, that Jones Gledhill possessed property against which 
Clark could assert a lien. 
Even if a check were "property," Jones Gledhill would be deprived due process if Clark 
were allowed to proceed against it, just as in Frazee. Jones Gledhill is a complete stranger to 
Clark's relationship with his Clients and Spence. Indeed, the preservation of the Clients' 
attorney-client privilege and work product necessitates that Jones Gledhill-which is adverse to 
13 
Clark, the Clients and Spence-remain unaware of the specifics of their relationship. As a result, 
Jones Gledhill has no meaningful opportunity to determine whether the Clients or Spence owe 
Clark anything. That Jones Gledhill knew Clark had previously represented the Clients and had 
asserted a lien several months before Anfinson's settlement is entirely inadequate to conclude, as 
Clark does, that Jones Gledhill was privy to all the information necessary to challenge Clark's 
claim as due process requires. (See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 9 (arguing "Jones Gledhill knew 
Clark had been Plaintiffs' counsel for several years, knew that Clark was claiming a lien, and 
knew there was a settlement").) 
For example, Jones Gledhill has no personal knowledge of: (1) the terms of Clark's fee 
agreements with his Clients or Spence; (2) the number of hours Clark spent working on the 
underlying case; (3) the value, if any, he added to that case; ( 4) the amount of costs Clark paid 
for the underlying case; ( 5) whether Clark was terminated for cause; and ( 6) whether the Clients 
or Spence had any viable claims against Clark. These facts, which are unknown to Jones 
Gledhill, impact Clark's right to fees. Because Jones Gledhill is not privy to that information, it 
has no meaningful opportunity to challenge Clark's claim for fees. Rather, Clark is required to 
"take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process [ other than an action against Jones Gledhill] to 
perfect and reduce his lien to ajudgment or order of the court." See Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466, 
660 P.2d at 931. 
The district court correctly relied upon Frazee to reach this conclusion when dismissing 
Clark's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 70-71.) Clark's action againstJones Gledhill is 
simply an attempt to recover his fees ( and perhaps more) "without the necessity of proving the 
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reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process" and to "levy against the property of 
[Jones Gledhill], who is a total stranger to the contract under which [Clark] claims money." Id. 
at 465, 660 P.2d at 930. This attempt is precisely the one this Court rejected in Frazee. Id. ("We 
decline to so interpret the attorney's charging lien statute .... "). 
2. Clark Cannot Meet the Requirements in Skelton. 
Challenging the district court's reliance on Frazee, Clark asserts that the Skelton analysis 
is the proper analysis in this case. While Clark relies upon Skelton, he ignores entirely the five 
requirements set forth in that case for enforcing an attorney lien. See Skelton, l 02 Idaho at 76, 
625 P.2d at 1079 (identifying requirements). Clark did not allege any of the Skelton 
requirements, and he makes no effort on appeal to argue that he has met them. (See R. 16-23; 
see also Appellants' Brief 9-13.) Regardless, Clark can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim that would entitle him to relief. 
Clark cannot meet any of the Skelton requirements. The first Skelton requirement is that 
"there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution." Id. As discussed above, there is 
no "fund" in this case because Jones Gledhill only received a check-not actual proceeds-from 
Anfinson; that check had already been sent to Spence when Clark sued Jones Gledhill; and none 
of the Anfinson settlement proceeds are ever going to return to Jones Gledhill, as the district 
court correctly noted. (See infra at pp. 15-16.) 
Even assuming there were an actual fund under Jones Gledhill's control, Clark still fails 
to meet the other four remaining Skelton requirements to enforce a lien. Clark has certainly not 
"agreed that [he will] look to the fund rather than the client[s] for his compensation." Id. 
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Indeed, Clark sued his Clients for the very same damages he seeks against Jones Gledhill-one 
week before suing Jones Gledhill. (Compare R. 8-15 (filed March 10, 2016) with R. 329-52 
(filed March 3, 2016).) Having sued his Clients for the same fees for which he is suing Jones 
Gledhill, Clark cannot credibly assert he has agreed to look only to the purported "fund" he 
contends Jones Gledhill has. 
Likewise, Clark cannot credibly claim his lien "is limited to costs, fees or other 
disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund was raised." Id. Notably, Clark failed 
to allege an exact amount of fees he is owed or the terms of any agreement under which such 
amount could be determined. Rather, Clark has alleged "damages of at least $500,000" and also 
damages for his "time and costs expended in recovering his attorney fees from [Spence and the 
Clients in Clark] in an amount to be proven at trial." (R. 21 at ,r,r 28-29.) 
Clark's damage allegation of $500,000 greatly exceeds any amount to which Clark could 
possibly be entitled from the $1,000,000 Anfinson settlement-a fact that Jones Gledhill has 
learned as a result of Clark's extraneous submissions in this case. According to Clark's fee 
agreements with his Clients, Clark has a 33.3 percent contingency on the Clients' net recovery. 
(R. 343-52.) In contrast, Clark's communications with Spence indicate Clark is entitled to a 
different amount under a fee-split arrangement, i.e., 35 percent of a 40 percent contingency or a 
14 percent contingency on the Clients' recovery. (R. 237-39.) Regardless of which terms apply, 
Clark's portion of the Anfinson settlement is nowhere near the $500,000 in damages he claims 
against Jones Gledhill. Furthermore, Clark's allegation that he is entitled to damages for 
pursuing his claims in Clark also shows that Clark is not limiting his claim against Jones Gledhill 
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to the fees he alleges he earned in the underlying action. (R. 21 at, 29 ("Defendants are 
required to compensate Clark for Clark's time and costs expended in recovery his fees from 
[Spence] and/or [the Clients].").) 
Clark also cannot show his services "operated substantially or primarily to secure the 
fund out of which he seeks to be paid." Id The Clients terminated Clark on August 26, 2015, 
(R. 279), but they did not settle their claims against Anfinson until several months later. (R. 20 
at, 21.) Given this time lapse, Clark is incorrect to assert that his efforts "substantially or 
primarily" resulted in a settlement occurring many months after his withdrawal. Id Moreover, 
Jones Gledhill, not Clark, was privy to certain legal services on behalf of the Clients that 
occurred after Clark's termination and that gave rise to Anfinson's settlement, and it personally 
knows that Clark did not participate in those efforts. 
Finally, there are no equitable considerations necessitating enforcement of a lien against 
Jones Gledhill. That Clark worked on the underlying action and was discharged before the 
Anfinson settlement is inadequate to establish an equitable reason to allow Clark to pursue his 
opponent, Jones Gledhill, for fees that his former Clients or co-counsel purportedly owe him. 
3. The District Court Did Not Misconstrue§ 3-205. 
Clark misperceives the issue in this case as one of "statutory interpretation" and attempts 
to read much more into § 3-205 than its plain language provides. The plain language of the 
statute provides only for the attachment of a lien to proceeds-and nothing more: "[T]he 
attorney ... has a lien ... which attaches to ... proceeds ... in whosoever hands they may 
come." Idaho Code§ 3-205 (emphasis added). It does not provide the means by which Clark 
17 
must perfect his lien or enforce his lien. Those issues are addressed by case law, including 
Frazee and Skelton, the requirements of which Clark cannot meet. 
Further, § 3-205 does not provide a claim for relief against literally anyone who has ever 
touched (no matter how briefly) proceeds if that person no longer possesses the proceeds. See 
Frazee, l 04 Idaho at 466, 660 P .2d at 931 ( concluding no fund exists where "the moneys had 
already been paid to the client").) Clark's overly broad reading of the statute ignores this fact 
and would result in the "potential for economic coercion by attorneys" that the Frazee Court 
sought to avoid. See idat 465,660 P.2d at 930. Under Clark's overreaching interpretation, an 
attorney could simply email every person-attorney or not-whom he thought might potentially 
come into contact with his clients' recovery-even if only briefly for transmission purposes-to 
create a claim for relief for himself against anyone who touched the proceeds. Clark's 
interpretation would require total strangers to an attorney's claim for fees to take affirmative 
action to protect that attorney's potential interest in his clients' recovery. 
With this power, the attorney could obstruct settlement, as Clark attempted to do in this 
case by demanding to be a payee on the Anfinson settlement check. (See R. 15.) Including 
Clark as a payee would have prevented Spence from negotiating the check, stymied Anfinson' s 
settlement, hindered Jones Gledhill's ability to obtain a dismissal and avoid the impending trial 
date, and otherwise unnecessarily embroiled Anfinson, its insurer and Jones Gledhill in Clark's 
fee dispute-a dispute in which they have no stake and about which they have no personal 
knowledge. This Court should decline to interpret § 3-205 to allow a discharged attorney to 
18 
interfere in this manner with the resolution of the litigation in which he formerly provided 
services under the auspices of enforcing an attorney lien. 
C. Jones Gledhill Owed Clark No Duty of Care. 
Contrary to Clark's allegations, Jones Gledhill had no legal duty to protect Clark's 
attorney lien by including Clark's name as payee on the Anfinson settlement check. (R. 21 at 
, 26.) Clark misrepresents that the district court rejected Jones Gledhill's argument that it did 
not owe Clark a duty of care. (Appellants' Brief at 15-16 ("The District Court also rejected 
Jones Gledhill's arguments in their Motion to Dismiss ... that defendants owed no duty of 
reasonable care.").) The district court actually ruled the exact opposite: "[Jones Gledhill] owed 
no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests. It was Clark's duty to protect 
his own interests, which he failed to do." (R. 72 (emphasis added).) 
The district court's ruling is correct. Jones Gledhill owes Clark no duty of care to protect 
his interest in his Clients' settlement. Section 3-205 does not provide for a legal duty on behalf 
of anyone, let alone Clark's opponent, to protect his lien interests in his Clients' recovery. 
Section 3-205 only provides a means by which Clark may protect his interests in his fees but not 
a means by which others must protect that interest. Other than his reliance on § 3-205, Clark 
offers no argument or authority to support his assertion that Jones Gledhill owed him a duty to 
protect his interest in his Clients' settlement, and no such authority exists. (See R. 31-32 (setting 
forth additional argument and authorities Jones Gledhill owed Clark no duty of care).) 
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1. The Litigation Privilege Protects Jones Gledhill. 
Moreover, any claim against Jones Gledhill is barred by the litigation privilege. 5 "This 
privilege is predicated on the long-established principle that the efficient pursuit of justice 
requires that attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak and write freely in the course of 
litigation without the fear ofreprisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel." Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,836,243 P.3d 642,652 (2010) (citation omitted). In Taylor, this 
Court expanded the privilege to "encompass conduct, as well as statements, which occur during 
the course oflitigation .... " Id. at 837, 243 P.3d at 653. It held that "where attorneys are being 
sued by the opponent of their client in a current or former lawsuit, and that suit arises out of the 
attorneys' legitimate representation of that client pursuant to that litigation, the privilege does 
apply." Id. at 839, 243 P.3d at 655. 
Once the lone prerequisite is met-"namely, that an attorney is acting within the scope of 
his employment"-the litigation privilege is an absolute privilege. Id. at 841,243 P.3d at 657. 
"It is presumed that an attorney who is acting or communicating in relation to his representation 
of a client is acting on behalf of that client and for that client's interests." Id. "To find otherwise 
would invite attorneys to divide their interest between advocating for their client and protecting 
themselves from a retributive suit," a result plainly contrary to an attorney's ethical obligations. 
Id. (citing I.R.P.C. 1.3(1)). 
5 Similar to Clark's misrepresentation that the district court rejected Jones Gledhill's argument 
that it owed Clark no duty of care, Clark misrepresents that the district court "rejected" Jones 
Gledhill's argument that it had a litigation privilege. (See Appellants' Brief at 16.) To the 
contrary, the district court never reached this issue, perhaps because it concluded there was no 
legal duty. 
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As the Court succinctly ruled: 
[W]here an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary of his client, as a 
result of actions or communications that the attorney has taken or made in the 
course of his representation of his client in the course oflitigation, the action is 
presumed to be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to this general 
rule would occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show that the 
attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of 
his representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests 
and not his client's. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Despain v. Unigard Ins. Co., No. 4:14-CV-184-BLW, 2015 WL 
1003640, at* 1 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2015) (requiring allegation of conduct such as malicious 
prosecution or tortious interference with "personal desire to harm" to avoid privilege). 
Per Clark's own allegations, the litigation privilege applies to bar his action against Jones 
Gledhill. Clark expressly alleges that Jones Gledhill is a law firm and Graham and Fuhrman are 
attorneys; that they represented Anfinson in the underlying action at all relevant times; and that 
they conveyed a check from Anfinson to Spence in their capacity as legal counsel for Anfinson 
per a settlement agreement between the parties. (See R. 17 at 112-5; R. 20 at 1121, 23.) 
Notably, Clark does not-and cannot credibly-allege any independent act by Jones Gledhill 
outside the scope of its representation that indicates it was acting solely for its own interest and 
not in Anfinson's interests. Absent allegations of such conduct, the litigation privilege bars 
Clark's action. Although the district coUt-t never had to reach this issue, the privilege is an 
alternative basis upon which to affirm the district court's dismissal of Clark's complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6). See Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 454-55, 65 P.3d 192, 195-96 (2003) (noting 
Court "may uphold decisions on alternate grounds"). 
21 
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Clark's Motion to 
Amend. 
The district court denied Clark's motion to amend his complaint to add new defendants, 
including Anfinson and its insurer, and to assert several new allegations. (See R. 74-76 ( order 
denying motion to amend); R. 308-17 (proposed amendments).) Although Clark does not 
identify the district court's denial of his motion to amend as an issue on appeal, he expressly 
states that it erred by denying his motion to amend. (See Appellants' Brief at 4, 11 ("The District 
Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend.").) Clark fails to make any direct 
argument or cite any authority challenging the district court's denial, but out of an abundance of 
caution, Jones Gledhill addresses the district court's denial, which was proper. 
A. Standard of Review 
The denial of a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300, 302 (2005). 
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, the Court must consider: "(l) whether the court correctly 
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. 
( quotations omitted). The denial of a motion to amend is appropriate if the proposed claim is 
futile. Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875,882,303 P.3d 234,241 (2013). 
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B. Clark's Proposed Amendments Are Futile. 
Clark's proposed amendments are futile. Notably, Clark did not attempt to assert a new 
or different claim for relief. Rather, he proposed (1) additional allegations in support of his 
original claim, (R. 313 at ,r,r 26-32); and (2) the inclusion of additional defendants, including 
Anfinson and "John Doe Insurance Companies"-presumably Anfinson's insurer. (R. 308-10.) 
Regarding the proposed defendants, the district court ruled that "[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs 
seek to add new Defendants to this case, those new Defendant[ s] would have no liability to 
Plaintiffs for the same reason that the existing Defendants have no liability." (R. 75.) This ruling 
is correct, and Clark does not challenge it on appeal. 
Regarding Clark's new allegations in support of his original claim, the district court 
"reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, the Proposed Amended Complaint, Memoranda, and 
Declaration" and concluded that "[t]hese filings do not add any new facts or authorities that bear 
on the correctness of the judgment of the court." (Id) Clark appears to challenge this ruling 
arguing that "the District Court's ruling ignores the fact that Jones Gledhill directly interfered 
with Clark's ability to 'perfect' his lien .... Clark sought leave to amend his complaint to very 
specifically plead that Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to perfect his lien." 
(Appellants' Brief at 11 ( emphasis added).) 
Clark's proposed allegations, however, belie this argument. Contrary to Clark's 
assertion, he never even uses the words "interfere" or "interference" in his proposed allegations. 
(See R. 313 at ,r,r 26-32.) Further, he never argued in support of his motion to amend that he was 
attempting to specifically plead Jones Gledhill interfered or otherwise prevented him from 
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perfecting his lien. (See R. 322-23.) Rather, Clark argues for the first time on appeal that he 
alleged "interference" by Jones Gledhill. Because Clark failed to raise this argument below, the 
Court should reject it. Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509,512, 181 P.3d 435,438 (2007) 
("'The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal."'). Moreover, to the extent Clark is attempting to assert a negligence claim 
for tortious interference, his proposed allegations fail to state any of the requisite elements of 
such a claim. See Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1027, 772 P.2d 228,234 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(identifying elements of tortious interference). 
Rather than "specifically" pleading interference, Clark's proposed allegations appear to 
be an effort allege the Skelton requirements, which he originally failed to allege. His efforts, 
however, fail. Despite his new allegations, Clark still cannot meet the elements of Skelton. Most 
obviously, that he sued his Clients before suing Jones Gledhill establish he was not "look[ing] to 
the fund rather than the client for his compensation." See Skelton, 102 Idaho at 76, 625 P.2d at 
1079. (R. 313 at ,r 27 (proposing allegation that he sued his Clients first).) Also, Clark's 
allegation that his lien is limited to his earned fees is contradicted by his allegation that he is 
seeking fees against Jones Gledhill both for pursuing Clark and for general damages of "at least 
$500,000," which greatly exceeds any amount that Clark would be entitled under the terms of his 
fee agreements. See id (requiring lien limited to amount incurred in underlying litigation). (See 
R. 314 at ,r,r 39-40 ( damage allegations); see also infra at pp.19-20 ( discussing Clark's fee 
agreements).) Because Clark's newly proposed allegations still do not state a viable claim and 
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because Clark raises arguments not raised below, this Court should affirm the district court's 
denial of Clark's motion to amend. 
III. The Fee Award Under§ 12-121 Was Not an Abuse of Discretion. 
Clark pursued this case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. He 
disregarded established law; he did not argue any new or novel interpretation of§ 3-205; he did 
not argue the law should be extended or modified; and he was specifically warned by Jones 
Gledhill before filing his action that existing case law precluded his claim. Furthermore, Clark 
unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation by filing extraneous information in the record 
unrelated to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and by repeatedly disclosing confidential 
information in the record. For these reasons, the district court properly awarded Jones Gledhill 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews an award of attorney fees under § 12-121 at the trial level, applying a 
three-part test. Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402,409, 34 P.3d 1085, 1092 (2001). The 
. . . 
mqmry 1s: 
Id. 
(1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to do it; and 
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
B. Clark's Action Is Frivolous, Unreasonable and Without Foundation. 
This Court should affirm the district court's award of $26,250 in attorney fees to Jones 
Gledhill under§ 12-121. Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that attorney 
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fees under§ 12-121 may be awarded if the court finds that "the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in writing and 
include the basis and reasons for the award." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(2). In support of its fee 
award, the district court ruled that "Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case, which is 
undisputed by Plaintiffs." (R. 207; see also R. 100 ( conceding Jones Gledhill is prevailing 
party).) 
Regarding the frivolous, unreasonable and foundationless nature of the case, the district 
court further concluded: 
Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take 
affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claim 
unenforceable. . . . Plaintiffs did not argue a new or novel interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 3-205, nor argue that the law should be extended or modified. Plaintiff's 
[sic] "novel legal question" merely argued that the Court should ignore 
established precedent, which it has declined to do. 
Moreover, in correspondence before the suit was filed, Plaintiffs were specifically 
warned by Defendants that the claim failed based on Idaho case law. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' [sic] took action that increased the cost of litigation by 
filing [ confidential] documents [which] did not add anything to Plaintiffs' case 
anyhow . 
. . . . [T]here was no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claim, of which Plaintiffs' [sic] 
were fully aware before filing suit, and then Plaintiffs also unnecessarily 
increased the cost of litigation. 
Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs brought and pursued this 
case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation .... 
(R. 212-13 (footnote citations to record omitted).) 
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In support of its award, the district court also cited Idaho Military Historical Soc y, Inc. 
v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,329 P.3d 1072 (2014). (R. 211.) In that case, Maslen had possession 
of a historical "Fairchild" airplane owned by the Idaho Military Historical Society ("IMHS"). Id. 
at 626,329 P.3d at 1074. Maslen volunteered to store the plane in his hangar space and never 
indicated he expected payment. Id at 627, 329 P.3d at 1075. Later, Maslen refused to surrender 
the plane to the IMHS and filed a claim of lien with the FAA seeking comperrsatiorrfor expenses-
incurred while storing the plane. Id. at 626, 329 P.3d at 1074. After a bench trial, the court 
found Maslen's "claim oflien was with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the charges 
therein" and ordered Maslen to surrender the plane to IMHS. Id. at 629, 329 P.3d at 1077. 
Further, the court awarded IMHS fees under§ 12-121 and Rule 54. Id 
Maslen challenged the fee award on appeal, but the Court affirmed. It noted that 
Maslen's "claim oflien was without foundation, because there was no evidence that [he] was 
entitled to compensation." Id. at 631,329 P.3d at 1079. It also noted that "[t]he record in this 
case is clear that litigation to obtain possession of the aircraft should never have been necessary. 
The litigation was necessitated by factual claims that were indefensible." Id. at 632, 329 P.3d at 
1080. 
As in Maslen, Clark's litigation to recover his fees against his opponent, Jones Gledhill, 
should have never happened. Indeed, Clark eventually conceded that his lien was not 
enforceable against Jones Gledhill because he had not perfected his lien. Clark made this 
concession in support of his motion to amend, which he filed after oral argument but before the 
district court entered its Memorandum Decision. Specifically, Clark concedes "the lien is not 
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enforceable or collectable until such time [as] it is ultimately reduced to judgment, because the 
actual damages are not yet determined." (R. 320.) Further, Clark concedes he has no idea what 
the judgment amount will be but that he is attempting to determine that amount in his separate 
Clark action. (R. 321-22.) 
Clark cites to these concessions and argues that he was in "good faith" because his claim 
against Jones Gledhill "was not yet ripe." (Appellants' Brief at 16.) Apparently, Clark's 
assertion is that he could eventually enforce his lien against Jones Gledhill after adjudicating the 
amount of the lien against his Clients and Spence. Clark's claim, however, will never be ripe 
against Jones Gledhill because Jones Gledhill does not now and will never possess the Clients' 
settlement proceeds, as Clark's allegations conceded, and this district court correctly noted. 
(R. 20 at ,r 21; R 72.) Accordingly, Clark's claim of"good faith" is hollow. 
Clark's argument that he presented a "novel legal issue" is also meritless. (See 
Appellants' Brief at 15.) Clark contends his "novel" issue is Jones Gledhill's purported 
"interference" with his ability to perfect his lien. (Id.) As discussed above, however, this issue 
was never alleged or raised below and, regardless, Clark still fails to state a valid claim. (See 
infra at pp. 26-27.) Moreover, it is not "novel" to request that the court simply "ignore 
established precedent," as the district court noted. (R. 212.) 
Finally, contrary to Clark's argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
referring to Clark's filing of confidential records in support of its fee award.6 (Appellants' Brief 
6 Notably, Jones Gledhill did not seek fees associated with sealing the records. (See R. 148-53 
(identifying billing entries but excluding any for motion to seal).) Rather, the Clients specially 
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at 16-17.) The court clearly understood the nature of Clark's wrongful disclosures in both this 
case and Clark. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court noted that Clark had filed the 
same confidential records in Clark but had stipulated to a protective order in that case to rectify 
his wrongful disclosures. (R 68.) Clark's agreement with counsel to maintain confidentiality-
followed the very next day by his disclosure of confidential information in the record in this 
case-is also explained elsewhere in the record. (See R. 367-68 at ,r,r 4-7 ( explaining Clark's 
disclosures); R. 139 at pp. 12:1-13:24 (same).) Clark has no valid excuse for his improper 
disclosures or for unreasonably increasing the cost of this litigation by making them. 
The district court obviously perceived the issue as one of discretion and acted both within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards while exercising 
reason. See Anderson, 136 Idaho at 409, 34 P.3d at 1092 (2001). It carefully reviewed the 
filings in support of Jones Gledhill's fee request, made specific findings and conclusions, and 
awarded Jones Gledhill the amount it concluded was reasonable. This Court should affirm that 
award. 
IV. The District Court Properly Sealed the Clients' Confidential Records. 
At the outset, Jones Gledhill notes that the district court's decision to seal records has 
absolutely no bearing on the merits of this appeal, including Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss, 
Clark's motion to amend or the fee award. Clark does not and cannot argue that the district 
appeared under Rule 32 of the Idaho Administrative Rules to request sealing. They, however, 
did not file a petition for fees. 
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court's decision to seal documents somehow impacted its decisions on the merits, other than to 
conclude that Clark had unnecessarily increased the cost of this litigation. 
Further, Clark's former Clients-not Jones Gledhill-requested the documents to be 
sealed to protect their attorney-client privilege and work product, which Clark intentionally filed 
in the record. Jones Gledhill has no stake in whether these documents are sealed or not. The 
Clients, however, continue to assert that the documents the district court sealed should remain 
sealed to protect their interests in their underlying case, which remains on-going. See Forbush v. 
Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Supreme Court No. 44053 (filed March 21, 2016). 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the district court's decision to seal records under Rule 32 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 503, 272 
P.3d 474,475 (2011). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. 
Furthermore, "[h]armless error is not grounds for reversal." Rogers v. Trim House, 99 
Idaho 746,750,588 P.2d 945, 949 (1979). An error is harmless ifit does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002). A 
substantial right is one that potentially affects the outcome of the litigation. Rogers, 99 Idaho at 
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749, 588 P.2d at 948. Clark has the burden of showing a prejudicial error, but he fails to make 
any argument that the district court's sealing of documents somehow adversely affected his 
substantial rights. See id. 
B. The Disclosure of the Sealed Materials Would Harm the Clients. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when sealing certain documents in the 
record. In January 2016, counsel for the Clients sent Clark a letter expressly informing him that 
the Clients "have not authorized you, and you are not authorized to disclose-in court filings or 
otherwise-any protected information related to your representation of them, including your 
communications with The Spence Law Firm, its lawyers, or its personnel." (R. 367 at ,r 4.) 
Despite this warning, Clark filed his former Clients' confidential information in the record in 
Clark. Thereafter in that case, on May 3, 2016, Clark deposed the Clients. (R. 367-38 at ,r 5.) 
During the course of those depositions, the Clients' counsel discussed their concerns about 
Clark's disclosures of privileged information in the record and that the Clients did not intend to 
waive their attorney-client privilege or other protections. (Id.) At that time, Clark agreed on the 
record and in the presence of his former Clients that he would stipulate to a protective order to 
allow for the sealing ofrecords. (Id.; see also R. 139 at 11: 14-13:24.) 
Despite this agreement-the very next day-on May 4, Clark again filed his Clients' 
confidential information in the record in this case. Just as in Clark, the information included 
written communications about the underlying action between Clark and Spence, between Spence 
and the Clients, and between Clark and the Clients. (R. 236-48.) Additionally, in opposition to 
Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Clark included a detailed description of his views on 
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Spence's internal handling of the underlying case, including activities entirely unrelated to 
Anfinson. (R. at 250-54.) 
Because the Clients' underlying action remains on-going, the Clients moved under 
Rule 32 to seal the documents containing their protectable information. (R. 353-76.) In response 
to the Clients' motion, Clark again filed yet more of the Clients' confidential documents in the 
record. (R. 266.) 
The district court properly granted the Clients' motion to seal. Per the requirements of 
Rule 32(i), the Court entered finding of facts and conclusions oflaw. (R. 69.) Specifically, the 
district court found that "[t]he material sought to be sealed relates to sensitive, if not attorney-
client privileged, conversations between co-counsel, and clients, during Clark's representation of 
the former clients in the underlying case." (Id) Further, it found that "the materials sought to be 
sealed contain facts and statements that could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or 
harm to Clark's former clients. The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary 
and proper to seal the requested material." (Id) 
On appeal, Clark challenges the district court's decision to seal documents solely (and 
boldly) on the basis that he has previously made the same wrongful disclosures in the Clark case. 
Namely, Clark contends that because he disclosed confidential information in the public record 
in Clark, that same information should remain in the public record in this case. (See Appellants' 
Brief at 18.) Clark's challenge should be rejected for numerous reasons. First-and foremost-
Clark has no authority in any case or context to disclose his former Clients' protectable 
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information. To the contrary, Clark has an on-going duty to maintain that information as 
confidential, which duty he has intentionally breached repeatedly. See I.R.P.C. l.6(a). 
Second, that Clark originally disclosed his Clients' confidential information in Clark does 
not excuse his second wrongful disclosure in this case. Although the confidential information 
Clark filed in the Clark case remained in the public record on May 4-the day Clark filed it in 
this case-the Clients had specifically addressed Clark's duty to maintain their confidentiality 
the day before on May 3. Regardless, Clark made the same wrongful disclosures that he made in 
Clark in this case-the day after agreeing to maintain confidentiality. Thereafter, Clark refused 
to enter into a stipulation for a protective order in Clark, despite his May 3 agreement, thereby 
requiring the Clients to file and argue a motion for such an order. (See R. 139 at p. 13, 11. 16-24.) 
Third, that certain of Clark's improper disclosures in the Clark case remained unsealed at 
the time he filed Appellants' Brief is not a basis to conclude that the district court in this case 
abused its discretion by sealing confidential records. Instead of taking action in the Clark case to 
seal his improper filings or instead of notifying the Clients that they needed to do so, Clark yet 
again improperly disclosed documents in the public record in this appeal when requesting that 
this Court take judicial notice of them. (Motion for Judicial Notice (filed December 9, 2016); 
see also Order Denying Motion for Judicial Notice (January 13, 2017).) 
Perhaps, Clark is attempting to suggest that the Clients are not concerned about 
protecting their confidential information. Clark, however, certainly knows his suggestion is 
entirely untrue based upon: (1) the correspondence he received from the Clients' counsel before 
his flurry of lawsuits, (2) the discussion during depositions about the need to maintain the 
33 
Clients' confidentiality and his agreement-made in their presence-to do so, (3) the Clients' 
request that the district court seal their confidential documents in this case, ( 4) their efforts to 
obtain a protective order in Clark after Clark breached his agreement to stipulate to one, and 
(5) their opposition to Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice before this Court. Based upon these 
events, Clark undisputedly knows his Clients intend to protect their attorney-client privileged 
communications and work product, and Clark's disclosure of that information can only be 
described as intentional. 
Finally, Clark's repeated, intentional disclosures of his former Clients' confidential 
information in this case is particularly egregious because Clark is attempting to disclose the 
Clients' confidences to their adversary, Jones Gledhill, which has never been privy to the 
information. At least in Clark, the disclosures, while improper, are only immediately available 
to the parties in the Clark case who were already privy to the information. 
While Clark asserts the district court had no "reasoned basis" to seal records in this case, 
it is Clark who has exercised a serious abuse of discretion by flagrantly disregarding his duty of 
confidentiality. The district court correctly concluded the information sealed was protectable 
under Rule 32, and this Court should affirm that decision. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Clark is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121. Rather, Jones 
Gledhill is. Recently, this Court in Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, 161 Idaho 
60, 383 P.3d 1230 (2016), articulated when appellate fees under§ 12-121 are appropriate: 
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Section 12-121 allows an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party where the 
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the 
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has 
failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law. 
Further, attorney fees on appeal have been awarded under Section 12-121 when 
appellants failed to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below 
that were resolved by a district court's well-reasoned authority. 
Id. at 66,383 P.3d at 1236 (quotations and citations omitted). Fees under§ 12-121 have also 
been awarded where "[t]here is no basis in fact or law for [the appellant's] claims and [he] was 
so instructed by the district court below." Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281,289,385 P.3d 459, 
467 (2016). 
On appeal, Clark has failed to show that the district court failed to apply well-established 
law. As the district court noted, Clark "merely argued that the Court should ignore established 
precedent." (R. 212.) Having failed to convince the district court to ignore the law, Clark 
appealed and is now requesting that this Court ignore it. Further, Clark has failed to add any new 
authority or any new analysis in support of his appeal. Finally, Clark's appeal is not well taken 
given that he has already conceded below that the district court's ruling was correct. (See R. 320 
(acknowledging his "lien is not enforceable or collectable until such time [as] it is ultimately 
reduced to judgment, because the actual damages are not yet determined"); R. 321-22 
(acknowledging he has "no idea" what amount he is owed).) For these reasons, the Court should 
award fees on appeal to Jones Gledhill under § 12-121. 
This award should include Jones Gledhill's fees incurred in opposing Clark's motion for 
judicial notice, filed on December 9, 2016, which this Court denied on January 13, 2017. 
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Clark's motion was not well grounded in existing law or an extension thereof. Most notably, 
Clark failed to cite any legal authority in support of his motion, and the two Idaho authorities 
providing for judicial notice, Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and Idaho Code§ 9-101, 
are entirely inapplicable. (See Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Judicial 
Notice at pp. 7-9.) Furthermore, Clark undisputedly knows that he should not disclose in the 
public record the confidential information he submitted to this Court for judicial notice. Clark's 
repeated and inexplicable violations of his duty of confidentiality appear to be interposed for the 
improper purpose of increasing the cost of this (and other) litigation and jeopardizing his former 
Clients' underlying action. As a result, Clark has violated both the improper purpose clause and 
the frivolous filing clause ofldaho Appellate Rule 11.2. See Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 
987, 342 P.3d 907, 914 (2015) (concluding "attorney fees can be awarded as sanctions when a 
party or attorney violates either (a) the frivolous filings clause or (b) the improper purpose 
clause"). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests that this Court: (1) affirm 
the district court's grant of Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion; (2) affirm the district court's 
denial of Clark's motion to amend; (3) affirm the district court's award of fees to Jones Gledhill 
under§ 12-121; (4) affirm the district court's decision to seal records under Rule 32; (5) deny 
Clark's request for fees on appeal; and (6) grant Jones Gledhill's request for fees on appeal, 
including fees incurred to oppose to Clark's Motion for Judicial notice. 
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DATED THIS 7th day of February 2017. 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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